diff options
| author | 2026-05-29 11:18:14 +0100 | |
|---|---|---|
| committer | 2026-05-29 11:18:14 +0100 | |
| commit | 5ee66a0415e88f4fa78986c823dd1ad709524e70 (patch) | |
| tree | 57cffb07e398a55407b94fa3695e5fdcb5b91c5a /dot_config/systemd/user/waybar.service | |
| parent | 01df321e907b6c8568bb8622eb44a5c1486a0631 (diff) | |
| download | dotfiles-5ee66a0415e88f4fa78986c823dd1ad709524e70.tar.gz dotfiles-5ee66a0415e88f4fa78986c823dd1ad709524e70.tar.bz2 dotfiles-5ee66a0415e88f4fa78986c823dd1ad709524e70.zip | |
fix(iwd): revert MAC randomization — broke DHCP
`AddressRandomization=network` made iwd present a per-SSID random MAC
to every Wi-Fi network. On networks that pin DHCP leases or 802.1X
access to a specific hardware MAC (corporate Wi-Fi, routers with DHCP
reservations, MAC-filtered networks) this means iwd associates fine
but DHCP never completes — the new MAC is unknown to the upstream.
The privacy gain is marginal when the user only connects to a small
set of known APs anyway, and the cost (no IP on a familiar network)
is much worse than the threat model justified. Drop the override
entirely; iwd's defaults (permanent MAC, no IP config — systemd-networkd
remains the IP-layer authority via etc/systemd/network/30-wifi-bond0.network)
match what we actually want.
If we want privacy MAC again later, the right place is a systemd .link
file with MACAddressPolicy=random, applied per-interface, not iwd-wide.
Diffstat (limited to 'dot_config/systemd/user/waybar.service')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
