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authorLibravatar sommerfeld <sommerfeld@sommerfeld.dev>2026-05-29 11:18:14 +0100
committerLibravatar sommerfeld <sommerfeld@sommerfeld.dev>2026-05-29 11:18:14 +0100
commit5ee66a0415e88f4fa78986c823dd1ad709524e70 (patch)
tree57cffb07e398a55407b94fa3695e5fdcb5b91c5a /dot_config/systemd/user
parent01df321e907b6c8568bb8622eb44a5c1486a0631 (diff)
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fix(iwd): revert MAC randomization — broke DHCP
`AddressRandomization=network` made iwd present a per-SSID random MAC to every Wi-Fi network. On networks that pin DHCP leases or 802.1X access to a specific hardware MAC (corporate Wi-Fi, routers with DHCP reservations, MAC-filtered networks) this means iwd associates fine but DHCP never completes — the new MAC is unknown to the upstream. The privacy gain is marginal when the user only connects to a small set of known APs anyway, and the cost (no IP on a familiar network) is much worse than the threat model justified. Drop the override entirely; iwd's defaults (permanent MAC, no IP config — systemd-networkd remains the IP-layer authority via etc/systemd/network/30-wifi-bond0.network) match what we actually want. If we want privacy MAC again later, the right place is a systemd .link file with MACAddressPolicy=random, applied per-interface, not iwd-wide.
Diffstat (limited to 'dot_config/systemd/user')
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