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#!/usr/bin/env sh
# Sandbox wrapper for tools that parse data from untrusted network
# sources (mpv, yt-dlp, streamlink). The threat model is RCE in a
# subtitle / muxer / extractor that walks the user's home directory
# looking for SSH/GPG keys, password store, cloud tokens, etc.
#
# Compromise: most of the system is still reachable (--bind / /), so
# Wayland, PipeWire, DBus, GPU, hardware accel and config files all
# work transparently; the sandbox only tmpfs-shadows known-sensitive
# directories so a compromised parser cannot read them.
#
# Set SANDBOX=0 to bypass entirely for a single invocation:
# SANDBOX=0 mpv weird-codec-file.mkv
#
# Usage (called by the per-tool wrappers): _sandbox-net-parser /usr/bin/mpv "$@"
set -eu
if [ "${SANDBOX:-1}" = "0" ]; then
bin=$1
shift
exec "$bin" "$@"
fi
if ! command -v bwrap >/dev/null 2>&1; then
printf '%s: bwrap not installed; falling back to direct exec\n' "$0" >&2
bin=$1
shift
exec "$bin" "$@"
fi
bin=$1
shift
# Prevent re-entry: any tool spawned inside the sandbox that resolves
# `mpv`/`yt-dlp`/`streamlink` via PATH (e.g. streamlink launching mpv)
# must find the real binary, not another wrapper that would try to
# nest a second bwrap and fail. Strip ~/.local/bin and nix-profile/bin
# from PATH inside the namespace.
inner_path='/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin'
exec bwrap \
--bind / / \
--dev-bind /dev /dev \
--proc /proc \
--tmpfs /root \
--tmpfs "$HOME/.ssh" \
--tmpfs "$HOME/.gnupg" \
--tmpfs "$HOME/.password-store" \
--tmpfs "$HOME/.config/gh" \
--tmpfs "$HOME/.config/op" \
--tmpfs "$HOME/.aws" \
--tmpfs "$HOME/.local/share/keyrings" \
--tmpfs "$HOME/.local/share/pass" \
--setenv PATH "$inner_path" \
--die-with-parent \
--new-session \
-- "$bin" "$@"
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