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path: root/etc/iwd/main.conf
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* fix(iwd): revert MAC randomization — broke DHCPLibravatar sommerfeld3 days1-23/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | `AddressRandomization=network` made iwd present a per-SSID random MAC to every Wi-Fi network. On networks that pin DHCP leases or 802.1X access to a specific hardware MAC (corporate Wi-Fi, routers with DHCP reservations, MAC-filtered networks) this means iwd associates fine but DHCP never completes — the new MAC is unknown to the upstream. The privacy gain is marginal when the user only connects to a small set of known APs anyway, and the cost (no IP on a familiar network) is much worse than the threat model justified. Drop the override entirely; iwd's defaults (permanent MAC, no IP config — systemd-networkd remains the IP-layer authority via etc/systemd/network/30-wifi-bond0.network) match what we actually want. If we want privacy MAC again later, the right place is a systemd .link file with MACAddressPolicy=random, applied per-interface, not iwd-wide.
* feat(iwd): per-SSID MAC randomisationLibravatar sommerfeld3 days1-0/+23
AddressRandomization=network: iwd generates a deterministic per-SSID random MAC. Hardware MAC is never exposed on Wi-Fi; reconnects to the same network reuse the same MAC, so DHCP leases, WPA-EAP creds and captive portals stay stable. EnableNetworkConfiguration=false keeps systemd-networkd authoritative for IP — the existing 30-wifi-bond0.network setup is unaffected and the wlan interface still gets enslaved into bond0.