diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'dot_local/bin/executable__sandbox-net-parser')
| -rw-r--r-- | dot_local/bin/executable__sandbox-net-parser | 16 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/dot_local/bin/executable__sandbox-net-parser b/dot_local/bin/executable__sandbox-net-parser index 648ad0f..d998ace 100644 --- a/dot_local/bin/executable__sandbox-net-parser +++ b/dot_local/bin/executable__sandbox-net-parser @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ #!/usr/bin/env sh # Sandbox wrapper for tools that parse data from untrusted network -# sources (mpv, yt-dlp, streamlink). The threat model is RCE in a +# sources (yt-dlp, streamlink). The threat model is RCE in a # subtitle / muxer / extractor that walks the user's home directory # looking for SSH/GPG keys, password store, cloud tokens, etc. # @@ -9,10 +9,13 @@ # work transparently; the sandbox only tmpfs-shadows known-sensitive # directories so a compromised parser cannot read them. # +# (mpv itself is run as the io.mpv.Mpv flatpak, which is its own +# sandbox — no extra bwrap wrapper needed.) +# # Set SANDBOX=0 to bypass entirely for a single invocation: -# SANDBOX=0 mpv weird-codec-file.mkv +# SANDBOX=0 streamlink weird-stream-url # -# Usage (called by the per-tool wrappers): _sandbox-net-parser /usr/bin/mpv "$@" +# Usage (called by the per-tool wrappers): _sandbox-net-parser /usr/bin/yt-dlp "$@" set -eu @@ -33,10 +36,9 @@ bin=$1 shift # Prevent re-entry: any tool spawned inside the sandbox that resolves -# `mpv`/`yt-dlp`/`streamlink` via PATH (e.g. streamlink launching mpv) -# must find the real binary, not another wrapper that would try to -# nest a second bwrap and fail. Strip ~/.local/bin and nix-profile/bin -# from PATH inside the namespace. +# `yt-dlp`/`streamlink` via PATH must find the real binary, not another +# wrapper that would try to nest a second bwrap and fail. Strip +# ~/.local/bin and nix-profile/bin from PATH inside the namespace. inner_path='/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin' exec bwrap \ |