From 1a8a19e6286aa58c5a46f03882f8f09e54456051 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: sommerfeld <sommerfeld@sommerfeld.dev>
Date: Fri, 29 May 2026 11:18:12 +0100
Subject: feat(sandbox): bwrap wrappers for mpv, yt-dlp, streamlink
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These three tools are the native (non-flatpak) network parsers in the
install set — every other internet-facing app is already flatpak'd. The
threat model is a RCE in a subtitle/extractor/muxer that walks $HOME
looking for SSH keys, GPG keyring, pass store, cloud tokens, etc.

Approach (defence in depth, not full sandboxing):
- bwrap --bind / / keeps Wayland, PipeWire, DBus, GPU, hwaccel and all
  config files working transparently.
- --tmpfs over known-sensitive dirs (.ssh, .gnupg, .password-store,
  .config/gh, .config/op, .aws, .local/share/keyrings) blanks them
  from the sandbox view; a compromised parser literally cannot see them.
- inner PATH stripped of ~/.local/bin so streamlink's spawn of `mpv`
  resolves to /usr/bin/mpv and does not re-enter the sandbox.
- --die-with-parent + --new-session for tidy lifecycle.
- Escape hatch: SANDBOX=0 mpv ... bypasses for one invocation.
- Graceful degradation if bwrap is missing (warns and execs anyway).

bubblewrap added explicitly to meta/base.txt (was implicit via flatpak).

Wrappers in ~/.local/bin shadow /usr/bin via dot_zprofile:15 PATH order.
Not symlinked into the Ubuntu VM (nix/vm.nix does not touch ~/.local/bin),
which is fine: those tools on the headless VM don't need sandboxing.
---
 dot_local/bin/executable__sandbox-net-parser | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 dot_local/bin/executable__sandbox-net-parser

(limited to 'dot_local/bin/executable__sandbox-net-parser')

diff --git a/dot_local/bin/executable__sandbox-net-parser b/dot_local/bin/executable__sandbox-net-parser
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..648ad0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dot_local/bin/executable__sandbox-net-parser
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
+# Sandbox wrapper for tools that parse data from untrusted network
+# sources (mpv, yt-dlp, streamlink). The threat model is RCE in a
+# subtitle / muxer / extractor that walks the user's home directory
+# looking for SSH/GPG keys, password store, cloud tokens, etc.
+#
+# Compromise: most of the system is still reachable (--bind / /), so
+# Wayland, PipeWire, DBus, GPU, hardware accel and config files all
+# work transparently; the sandbox only tmpfs-shadows known-sensitive
+# directories so a compromised parser cannot read them.
+#
+# Set SANDBOX=0 to bypass entirely for a single invocation:
+#   SANDBOX=0 mpv weird-codec-file.mkv
+#
+# Usage (called by the per-tool wrappers): _sandbox-net-parser /usr/bin/mpv "$@"
+
+set -eu
+
+if [ "${SANDBOX:-1}" = "0" ]; then
+  bin=$1
+  shift
+  exec "$bin" "$@"
+fi
+
+if ! command -v bwrap >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  printf '%s: bwrap not installed; falling back to direct exec\n' "$0" >&2
+  bin=$1
+  shift
+  exec "$bin" "$@"
+fi
+
+bin=$1
+shift
+
+# Prevent re-entry: any tool spawned inside the sandbox that resolves
+# `mpv`/`yt-dlp`/`streamlink` via PATH (e.g. streamlink launching mpv)
+# must find the real binary, not another wrapper that would try to
+# nest a second bwrap and fail. Strip ~/.local/bin and nix-profile/bin
+# from PATH inside the namespace.
+inner_path='/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin'
+
+exec bwrap \
+  --bind / / \
+  --dev-bind /dev /dev \
+  --proc /proc \
+  --tmpfs /root \
+  --tmpfs "$HOME/.ssh" \
+  --tmpfs "$HOME/.gnupg" \
+  --tmpfs "$HOME/.password-store" \
+  --tmpfs "$HOME/.config/gh" \
+  --tmpfs "$HOME/.config/op" \
+  --tmpfs "$HOME/.aws" \
+  --tmpfs "$HOME/.local/share/keyrings" \
+  --tmpfs "$HOME/.local/share/pass" \
+  --setenv PATH "$inner_path" \
+  --die-with-parent \
+  --new-session \
+  -- "$bin" "$@"
-- 
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