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author | sommerfeld <sommerfeld@sommerfeld.dev> | 2024-07-24 23:01:43 +0100 |
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committer | sommerfeld <sommerfeld@sommerfeld.dev> | 2024-07-24 23:01:43 +0100 |
commit | b2bd1ab0d70b95608732e7a666083fa709b5ca0f (patch) | |
tree | dfa0ebd486fe62f7087adbb3bc84de24cac6ce79 | |
parent | 33a5b12034e2c55745c6cde7531aa90c1420792f (diff) | |
download | dotfiles-master.tar.gz dotfiles-master.tar.bz2 dotfiles-master.zip |
-rw-r--r-- | firefox/user-overrides.js | 10 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/firefox/user-overrides.js b/firefox/user-overrides.js index 514bcb9..9e02248 100644 --- a/firefox/user-overrides.js +++ b/firefox/user-overrides.js @@ -75,14 +75,4 @@ user_pref("privacy.resistFingerprinting.testGranularityMask", 4); * [1] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/1635603 ***/ user_pref("privacy.resistFingerprinting.exemptedDomains", "meet.google.com"); -/* 1212: set OCSP fetch failures (non-stapled, see 1211) to hard-fail - * [SETUP-WEB] SEC_ERROR_OCSP_SERVER_ERROR - * When a CA cannot be reached to validate a cert, Firefox just continues the connection (=soft-fail) - * Setting this pref to true tells Firefox to instead terminate the connection (=hard-fail) - * It is pointless to soft-fail when an OCSP fetch fails: you cannot confirm a cert is still valid (it - * could have been revoked) and/or you could be under attack (e.g. malicious blocking of OCSP servers) - * [1] https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2013/07/29/ocsp-stapling-in-firefox/ - * [2] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/04/19/revchecking.html ***/ -user_pref("security.OCSP.require", false); - user_pref("browser.fixup.domainsuffixwhitelist.i2p", true); |