My linux config and rc files https://git.sommerfeld.dev/dotfiles/atom/dot_local/bin/executable_yt-dlp?h=master 2026-05-29T10:18:12Z 2026-05-29T10:18:12Z sommerfeld sommerfeld@sommerfeld.dev 2026-05-29T10:18:12Z urn:sha1:1a8a19e6286aa58c5a46f03882f8f09e54456051 These three tools are the native (non-flatpak) network parsers in the install set — every other internet-facing app is already flatpak'd. The threat model is a RCE in a subtitle/extractor/muxer that walks $HOME looking for SSH keys, GPG keyring, pass store, cloud tokens, etc. Approach (defence in depth, not full sandboxing): - bwrap --bind / / keeps Wayland, PipeWire, DBus, GPU, hwaccel and all config files working transparently. - --tmpfs over known-sensitive dirs (.ssh, .gnupg, .password-store, .config/gh, .config/op, .aws, .local/share/keyrings) blanks them from the sandbox view; a compromised parser literally cannot see them. - inner PATH stripped of ~/.local/bin so streamlink's spawn of `mpv` resolves to /usr/bin/mpv and does not re-enter the sandbox. - --die-with-parent + --new-session for tidy lifecycle. - Escape hatch: SANDBOX=0 mpv ... bypasses for one invocation. - Graceful degradation if bwrap is missing (warns and execs anyway). bubblewrap added explicitly to meta/base.txt (was implicit via flatpak). Wrappers in ~/.local/bin shadow /usr/bin via dot_zprofile:15 PATH order. Not symlinked into the Ubuntu VM (nix/vm.nix does not touch ~/.local/bin), which is fine: those tools on the headless VM don't need sandboxing.